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Response to Simon Susen’s  “Bourdieusian Reflections on Language:  
Unavoidable Conditions of the Real Speech Situation”. 
 
After the collaboration between Jean-Claude Passeron and Pierre Bourdieu had come to an 
end at about 1972, Passeron wrote a thèse d’état based on the teaching he had done at the 
University of Nantes after establishing a Department of Sociology there in the late 1960s.  It 
was submitted at the University of Nantes and entitled Les mots de la sociologie [the words 
of sociology] (Passeron 1980).  Passeron selected large amounts of this thesis for inclusion in 
his Le raisonnement sociologique [Sociological reasoning], first published in 1991 and 
republished in 2006 (Passeron 1991 and 2006).  Selecting articles he had written in the 1980s, 
Passeron regarded Le raisonnement sociologique as his improvement of Le métier de 
sociologue [the sociological craft] which he had co-authored with Bourdieu and 
Chamboredon in 1968 (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, Passeron 1968, [1991]).  As its title 
suggests, the theme of Passeron’s thesis was the nature and status of the words adopted in 
seeking to conduct enquiries in the sociology of culture.  The text was the product of his 
engagement with the problems of his research students and also based on his observations of 
the language of adjudication adopted by staff when acting as jurors in assessing the research 
reports submitted by students.  Passeron’s main intention was to insist that the language of 
sociology is different in kind from the language of philosophy.  He referred to Lalande’s 
Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie [technical and critical vocabulary of 
philosophy] (Lalande (1908), 1960) and also to the attempt made to imitate that work by 
disciples of his former tutor, Daniel Lagache, in producing a Vocabulaire de la psychoanalyse 
[vocabulary of psycho-analysis] (Laplanche & Pontalis 1967), in order to argue that a 
comparable lexicon of sociological words would be ‘impossible’ (1980), (changed to 
‘infaisable’ [impractical or undo-able] in 1991).  Language deployed in sociological 
explanation is always contingent.  Unlike philosophical or psychoanalytic language, 
sociological language is always necessarily in a dialectical relationship with what it seeks to 
analyse precisely because much social and cultural behaviour is expressed in words and 
because, therefore, the language of explanation is immersed linguistically in what it seeks to 
explain.  Passeron’s determination about this point explains, in part, his dissociation from 
Bourdieu.  Passeron believed that Bourdieu began to treat more absolutely than contingently 
the conceptual framework which they had developed together.  The ‘habitus’, for instance, 
was, in origin, a philosophical concept which Bourdieu initially used heuristically but which, 
in Passeron’s view, he began to reify.  Passeron’s accusation was not simply that Bourdieu 
began to treat concepts philosophically.  More questionably still, in Passeron’s view, 
Bourdieu had begun to use a word like ‘reproduction’ to signify an universally valid 
correlation between the transmission of cultural tastes and social positions rather than as a 
linguistic device adopted contingently to explain the particular situation in France at the end 
of the 1960s.  (see Passeron 1986, which became Chapter 4 of Passeron ((1991), 2006,  
[2013]). 
 
Simon Susen has given us a brilliantly lucid expository systematisation of Bourdieu’s 
thinking in respect of language.  He is explicit in acknowledging that Bourdieu was opposed 
to Habermas’s ‘communication-theoretic approach’ and that Bourdieu rightly identified that  
 ‘we need to identify the unavoidable conditions of the real speech situation, rather than the 
avoidable conditions of the ideal speech situation, in order to understand that the legitimacy 
of linguistic validity is always contingent upon the validity of social legitimacy’ (p.1).  Susen 
proposes to examine Bourdieu’s work on language to consider whether it provides an 
adequate conceptual framework to sustain an anti-Habermasian position.  He recognises that 
there are three reasons why the task of identifying the ‘ontological presuppositions,  
that is, ... a set of universal assumptions about the very nature of language’ (p.1) held by 
Bourdieu  appears not to have been attempted before.  The three reasons are well stated and, 
in essence, amount to the reluctance to consider philosophically discussions of language 
which Bourdieu advanced sociologically and in specific social contexts. Nevertheless, Susen 
persists in his intention to demonstrate that ‘there is not only a Bourdieusian theory of 
language, but also a Bourdieusian philosophy of language’.  In trying to evaluate 
philosophically a Bourdieusian philosophy of language,  Susen simultaneously responds to 
the tendency in the development of Bourdieu’s thinking which Passeron disparaged and is 
himself, again in Passeron’s argument,  ‘guilty’ of attempting to criticise that thinking in 
terms of an inappropriate intellectual discourse. In this endeavour, Susen specifies in respect 
of language the wider argument he advanced in respect of the social theories of Bourdieu and 
Habermas in his The foundations of the social (Susen 2007), and I find myself re-stating the 
position which I sought to express in my review of his book (Robbins 2010).  It isn’t just that 
Susen tries to extract a philosophy of language from texts in which Bourdieu was writing 
sociologically.  Much more importantly, he de-contextualises those texts.  Bourdieu was 
always insistent that his texts were interventions, that his writings and talks were 
‘performative’ rather than referential.1  In the 1960s, this non-representational dimension was 
sustained in the sequence of books offering sociological accounts of the cultural implications 
of schooling, photography, and art galleries, by the commitment to submit details within 
published findings of the procedures adopted instrumentally to produce general findings from 
particular enquiries2
                                                          
1 It is significant that Susen gives no reference to the work of J.L. Austin (Austin (1962), 1976) which clearly 
influenced Bourdieu, nor to Choses dites (Bourdieu 1987, [1990]) which, as the title suggests, was Bourdieu’s 
attempt to be explicit about his speech acts. (‘Things spoken’ or, perhaps better, ‘Spoken things’ would each 
convey the sense of Bourdieu’s title that he was offering linguistic performances rather than referential 
statements.  The title actually adopted in the published translation – In other words (Bourdieu, [1990]) – 
wrongly conveys the sense of paraphrase as if there are prior meanings which are expressed in words, implying 
a commitment to a Saussurian langue/parole duality. 
.  Passeron could have agreed with Bourdieu’s rejection of the attempts 
of structuralism to provide a theory of society in his ‘Structuralism and theory of sociological 
knowledge’ (Bourdieu 1968), but not with the alternative which Bourdieu seemed to espouse 
– that of, rightly, emphasizing sociological method but, wrongly, identifying that method as a 
variant of unified scientific method, a revival of Comtist ‘prime philosophy’, rather than as 
accepting its pluralist character and its historical contingency. From the point at which 
Bourdieu began to outline his ‘theory of practice’, he began to attempt to amalgamate this 
philosophy of science with a resurgent interest in the Husserlian emphasis (expressed in The 
crisis of European sciences) on the rootedness of science in the pre-predicative experiences of 
2 I tried to demonstrate this in Robbins (2007). 
the life-world, and to do this experientially rather than rationally. It was as if he had contrived 
to incorporate his philosophical position within his own social trajectory, thereby rendering it 
neither exclusively rational nor exclusively subjective.  This balancing act explains why 
Passeron thought that Bourdieu had both moved towards ‘culturalist’ subjectivism and 
adopted a philosophical perspective.  This also explains how Bourdieu sought to practise 
what he preached (or it may be that what he preached was a rationalisation of the way in 
which he always instinctively practised).  He tried to adopt his theory of practice in his own 
practice.  His attitude towards language was no exception.  It is not possible to extrapolate a 
study of language from his writing.  His writing about language no more constituted a 
sociology of language than a philosophy of language.  Rather it sought to enact sociological 
reflexivity in practice.  He was not interested in contributing to ‘sociolinguistics’ but, rather, 
in practising socio-linguistics. (He insisted on the hyphen).  The problem, therefore, is that 
the framework which Susen adopts for his discussion necessarily imposes formally a 
judgement which is not contained in his consideration of the substantive position which he 
derives from Bourdieu’s work. As I concluded earlier: ‘The “foundations of the social” need 
to be defined in social exchange which entails establishing socially inclusive institutional 
foundations of social theoretical discourse’ (Robbins 2010). 
Bourdieu’s writing about language needs to be contextualised in two ways – first as itself 
situated and strategic action, and, second, as the assimilation of previous writing.  The first 
way is Bourdieusian in interpreting his texts in relation to his social trajectory.  The second 
way could be said to be Passeronian in identifying socio-historically the textual influences 
which became constitutive of Bourdieu’s synthesized approach.  Both involve the search for 
what Passeron variously called in the sub-title to his Le raisonnement sociologique, either 
‘L’espace non poppérien du raisonnement naturel’ [the space for non-Popperian natural 
reasoning] (1991) or ‘Un espace non poppérien de l’argumentation’ [a space for non-
Popperian argument] (2006).  In spite of this nuanced difference between Passeron’s 
terminology in 1991 and 2006, the essential common factor in both contextual orientations 
lies in the opposition to the attempted development of a formal epistemology of social 
science such as Popper had advanced for the natural sciences in the Logic of Scientific 
Discovery.  The same opposition applies in respect to the study of language. 
In relation to Bourdieu’s study of ‘literature’, Anna Boschetti confronted the same issue as 
does Susen in commenting on Bourdieu’s study of  ‘language’.  In commencing her 
discussion, she responded by reminding readers that ‘Bourdieu himself stated, referring to 
Gaston Bachelard, that “epistemology is always conjunctural;  its propositions and thrust are 
determined by the principal scientific threat of the moment” (Bourdieu & Wacquant [1992], 
174)’ (Boschetti 2006, 135).  Susen is not inclined to accept this starting point.  He early 
states that Bourdieu ‘dedicated a significant part of his work to the study of language’ and, in 
evidence, offers a footnote which appears to cite twelve separate texts.  Of these, however, 
six texts are chapters of Ce que parler veut dire [what speaking means] (Bourdieu 1982i).  
The other six are: “La production de la croyance” [the product ion of belief] (Bourdieu 1977i, 
[1980]); ‘Sur le pouvoir symbolique’ [On symbolic power], cited as 1992 [1977] but which 
was first given as a lecture at Harvard in 1973 (Bourdieu 1977ii, [1977]; ‘Le marché 
linguistique’[the linguistic market], cited as 1993 [1984e] but which was first given as a 
lecture in Geneva in December, 1978; ‘Le fétichisme de la langue’[the fetichism of 
language], co-authored with Luc Boltanski and published in 1975 (Bourdieu & Boltanski 
1975); ‘Le couturier et sa griffe’ [the couturier and his label], co-authored with Yvette 
Delsaut and also published in 1975 (Bourdieu & Delsaut 1975); and, finally, a section of An 
Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Bourdieu & Wacquant [1992]) – ‘Interest, habitus, 
rationality’ – based on discussion at a Chicago workshop of the Spring of 1988.  The six texts 
derived from Ce que parler veut dire do not reflect the totality of the contributions selected 
for that volume. Although this text of 1982, with its sub-title - L’économie des échanges 
linguistiques [the economy of linguistic exchanges] – may be branded as a study of language, 
it does in fact mainly constitute a collection of earlier occasional papers which relate 
predominantly to other concerns. The text cited by Susen as 1982d is the first chapter of the 
first of the three parts of Ce que parler veut dire.  The first section (‘L’économie des échanges 
linguistiques’) is dated from the summer of 1980, and the first chapter, with the same title, is 
a revised version of a seminar paper which Bourdieu had given in the Ecole des Hautes 
Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) at the end of 1976 and published in 1977 (Bourdieu 
1977iii) which, in turn, builds upon ‘Le marché des biens symboliques’ [the market of 
symbolic goods] which he had published in 1971 (Bourdieu 1971i).  The text cited by Susen 
as 1982g is the first of four chapters in Part II of Ce que parler veut dire – a part which was 
given the title adopted subsequently for the English edition of 1991 and the French re-edition 
of 2001 (Language and Symbolic Power/Langage et pouvoir symbolique) (Bourdieu 1991, 
2001).  This chapter was 'Le langage autorisé: les conditions sociales de l'efficacité du 
discours rituel'[Authorized Language : the Social Conditions for the Effectiveness of Ritual 
Discourse],  which had first been published in Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales in 
1975 (Bourdieu 1975i).  Susen does not cite the three other chapters of this part which were 
‘Les rites d’institution’ [Rites of Institution] which had originally been given as a conference 
paper in Neuchâtel in October, 1981 (Bourdieu 1982ii); ‘La force de la représentation’ [in 
full:  Identity and Representation:  elements for a Critical Reflection on the Idea of Region] 
first published in the book; and ‘Décrire et prescrire: les conditions de possibilité et les 
limites de l’efficacité politique’[Description and Prescription:  the Conditions of Possibility 
and the Limits of Political Effectiveness], originally published in 1981 (Bourdieu 1981).  
Susen cites the first chapter of Part III as 1982h.  This is 'Censure et mise en 
forme'[Censorship and the Imposition of Form],  which was originally published in 1975 as 
part of the article which Bourdieu wrote on Heidegger (Bourdieu 1975ii) which he later 
revised to be published in book form as L’ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger[The 
Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger] (Bourdieu 1988, [1991]).  The other chapters of Part 
III were re-issues of Bourdieu’s article of 1975 analysing Etienne Balibar’s critical remarks 
on Lire Le Capital [in full: Reading Marx: some critical remarks on ‘Some critical remarks 
about Lire le Capital’](Bourdieu 1975iii), and of his ‘Le Nord et le Midi’ [in full:  North and 




Susen identifies ten key features ‘that can – and, from a Bourdieusian perspective, indeed 
should – be regarded as inherent in language’ (p.1).  He offers his account as apparently a 
paraphrase of elements of Bourdieu’s  discourse so as to construct an uniform, systematic 
sense.  My point in pursuing above in detail Susen’s use of sources is to argue that in essence 
he derives his presentation from Bourdieu texts which belong to the period between 1972 and 
1982, but he does so without acknowledging that there may have been features of this 
historical period which caused Bourdieu to formulate his views in strategic ways related to 
                                                          
3 These bibliographic comments are derived from my discussion in Robbins (1991) where they are elaborated in 
Chapter 10, pp. 151-168. 
his position-taking at the time.  After his systematic presentation, Susen provides a synthesis 
followed by ‘critical reflections’ corresponding with each of the key features.  I want to try to 
illustrate the way in which a contextualisation of Susen’s use of Bourdieu texts might 
challenge the systematic formulations which he derives from them and, in turn, throw doubt 
on the validity of some of his critical remarks.  In the space available to me, I want to focus 
specifically on Susen’s fifth key feature – ‘The Discursivity of Language’ – and, within that, 
on two of the five levels which he identifies – a) between ordinary and scientific discourses 
and d) between instituted and ephemeral discourses.  Each of Susen’s key features demand 
comparable examination and I hope I have not chosen to focus only on those elements which 
help me most to make my case.  I believe that my kind of reservation applies throughout, 
although obviously to varying degrees. 
 
For his first ‘level’, Susen says in relation to ‘The Discursivity of Language’, that ‘ ...a 
distinction should be drawn between ordinary and scientific discourses’. (p.8). In support of 
this general summary of Bourdieu’s view, Susen cites Bourdieu texts ranging from 1968 to 
2001, and a range of secondary discussions of the topic, but his specific elaboration draws 
upon remarks in Le métier de sociologue (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron 1968) 
(Susen’s endnotes 52, 53, and 54).  Based on the reference in that text, derived from 
Bachelard, to the need for ‘epistemological vigilance’, Susen proceeds to outline Bourdieu’s 
general view of the relationship between ordinary and scientific discourses.  Without further 
reference to specific Bourdieu texts, Susen presents, as if paraphrases of Bourdieu, five bases 
of differentiation between the two discourses. Without evidence, he asserts that Bourdieu 
considered scientific and ordinary discourse to be qualitatively different, and, equally without 
detailing any source for his comment, Susen states categorically that ‘Ordinary and scientific 
discourses stand in a hierarchical relation to each other: the naïve spontaneity of the former is 
epistemologically inferior to the critical reflexivity of the latter.’ (p.9).  Susen concludes this 
part of his discussion with the summary statement that the discourses must be sharply 
distinguished and, in support of this contention, he offers two short quotes from Bourdieu’s 
inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, delivered on April 23rd
 
, 1982. 
For his fourth ‘level’, Susen says in relation to ‘The discursivity of language’, that ‘a 
distinction is to be drawn between instituted and ephemeral discourses’ (p. 10).  Here he 
draws on the English version of Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique (Bourdieu 1972) which 
was published in 1977 (Bourdieu 1977iv) as Outline of a Theory of Practice, citing this as 
Bourdieu (1977, [1972]), and the response which Bourdieu made in 1999 (Bourdieu 1999)  
included in a collection of articles assembled by the European Journal of Social Theory on 
Méditations pascalienne
 
s which had been published in 1997 (Bourdieu 1997, [2000]).. 
In offering his critical remarks on his representation of Bourdieu’s view of the relationship 
between ordinary and scientific discourses, Susen usefully distinguishes between three 
possible positions which he labels ‘positivist’, ‘interpretivist’, and ‘contextualist’.  He 
concludes that ‘Since Bourdieu unambiguously favours scientific over ordinary forms of 
knowledge, he tends to disregard the epistemic capacities of social actors ...’ (p. 31). Rather 
than regarding these capacities, which he breaks down into seven types, ‘as an epistemic 
privilege of scientists and experts’ (p.32), Susen insists that ‘we need to recognize that they 
are built into the human condition’(p. 32).  
 
In offering his critical remarks on his representation of Bourdieu’s view of the relationship 
between instituted and ephemeral discourses, Susen comments that ‘Bourdieu has a tendency 
to emphasize the relationally determined nature and reproductive function of the former and 
disregard the relatively unpredictable emergence and potentially transformative impact of the 
latter.’ (p. 33). 
 
It should be clear that my view is that Susen’s representations and critiques of Bourdieu  are 
diminished because they are a-historical. My contention is that the majority of the Bourdieu 
texts which Susen treats as being ‘about language’ derive from the decade between 1972 and 
1982 in which Bourdieu was ‘position-taking’ after having seized control of the Centre de 
Sociologie Européenne (CSE) from Aron after the events of May, 1968, and leading up to his 
appointment to the Chair of Sociology at the Collège de France at the end of 1981.  Of 
course, Bourdieu had always been interested in the relationship between ordinary and 
scientific discourses.  In Algeria, he had collected the narratives of interviewees during his 
research projects and had published them as ‘spontaneous sociology’ in the appendices of 
Travail et travailleurs en algérie (Bourdieu, Darbel, Rivet, & Seibel 1963).  As a young 
researcher he had experienced conflict between the need to dissociate his scientific analysis 
from the colonial perspective and the desire to justify a distinction between his observation of 
situations and those of participants.  He advocated the development of a dialectical 
relationship between perspectives derived from case-studies and those derived from statistical 
analysis (in his introduction to Part I of Travail et travailleurs en Algérie: ‘Statistique et 
sociologie’, Bourdieu, Darbel, Rivet & Seibel 1963, 9-13).  This was conceived of as a 
methodological, rather than ontological, dialectic and, as such, ordinary discourse was 
subsumed under scientific discourse during the work of the 1960s.  The fact that the dialectic 
had originally been seen as a phenomenological encounter between discourses and that 
neither case-study transcripts nor statistical data offered ‘truth’ was suppressed in the interest 
of producing research findings which would advance the scientific reputation of the CSE.  
Perhaps it was the aftermath of the events of May, 1968, that caused Bourdieu to revive the 
notion of research as phenomenological encounter, a notion which was in direct opposition to 
Aron’s endorsement of the Weberian separation of scientific and political vocations.  
Bourdieu’s thoughts and actions of the 1970s were both dominated by tensions associated 
with the political implications of the relationship between ordinary and scientific discourses.  
There was the inclination to recognize the validity of everyday discourse and, simultaneously, 
the recognition that the professional raison d’être of the sociologist had to be to produce a 
discourse which was distinct from the everyday.  Whilst being sceptical about the ‘truth’ of 
sociological explanations, Bourdieu formulated a mission whereby he would go along with 
the recognised status of social science in order to liberate and give voice to ‘vulgar’ views.  
Appropriating the legitimacy of instituted social science would give Bourdieu the power to 
advance the political interests of those without voice.  Bourdieu’s concern about language 
was essentially a concern about power.  The full titles of the component essays of Ce que 
parler veut dire indicate that Bourdieu was perplexed about political representation and about 
the relationship between description and prescription. ‘L’opinion publique n’existe pas’ 
[public opinion does not exist] was first given as a paper at a conference at Arras in 1971 
(Bourdieu 1971ii) precisely when Bourdieu was re-opening the question of the relationship 
between spontaneous and scientific sociology.  Pollsters generate ‘public opinion’ by 
structurally discriminating against ordinary language users who do not possess the language 
of survey questions.  In 1971, the role of the social scientist was conceived to be that of a 
meta-sociologist who could analyse both the intentions of pollsters and the nil responses of 
those polled.  This meta-sociological sociological reflexivity seemed to safeguard both the 
objectivity of the social scientist and the validity of ordinary discourse as also outlined at the 
time in ‘Three Forms of Theoretical Knowledge’ (Bourdieu 1973) which was a spin-off from 
his progression from Esquisse (Bourdieu 1972) to Outline (Bourdieu 1977iv).  When 
Bourdieu came to re-use the text of ‘L’opinion publique n’existe pas’ in the chapter of La 
Distinction (Bourdieu 1979ii, [1986]) entitled ‘Cultural Politics’, however, he had introduced 
the view that ordinary discourses are not pure expressions of ordinary experience, as 
presupposed by the notion of habitus, but rather are partially assimilated versions of instituted 
discourses – in particular that political opinions are not held in radically individualistic ways 
but instead through the mediation of policy positions formulated by political groups or 
parties.  In other words, during the 1970s, Bourdieu’s reflections on the distinction between 
ordinary and scientific language became inseparable from consideration of the relationship 
between the inherited dispositions of individuals and public positions represented by 
institutions.  This was the period when, to Passeron’s disquiet, these reflections became 
overtly reflexive, self-regarding, or self-presentational.  In a mutually reinforcing manner, 
Bourdieu’s emerging theory of practice was implemented in his practice.  This was a delicate 
balancing act.  At the same time as Bourdieu was writing an analysis of Heidegger’s 
philosophy which attempted to show that Heidegger had perverted philosophical discourse 
and the institutional space it occupied by absorbing volkisch popular discourse within it, he 
was aspiring to an institutional position which would enable him to deploy the legitimacy of 
sociological discourse as a device to disclose the quotidian world views of ordinary people.  
The essay entitled ‘L’ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger’ (Bourdieu 1975ii) appeared in 
Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales at the end of the year in which the journal had been 
launched. We know from Luc Boltanski’s reminiscences in Rendre la réalité inacceptable
 
 
(Boltanski 2008) that the journal was launched in part because members of the CSE had 
become frustrated that their work was not being accepted for publication by mainstream 
French sociological journals.  The journal was itself, therefore, an attempt to give a voice to a 
dominated sociological discourse – a discourse which methodologically sought in turn to give 
a voice to people who were traditionally simply the objects of dominant sociological 
discourse.  Meanwhile, Bourdieu was substantively ambivalent about Heideggerian 
philosophy because he was disposed to incorporate the ontological critique of epistemology 
developed by Heidegger within his own practical critique of sociology.  At some point in the 
second half of the 1970s Bourdieu must have decided to apply for a post at the Collège de 
France. Concern with ‘rites of institution’ and the potency of ‘authorized language’ were 
elements of a kind of intellectual reconnaissance of the social move he was about to make.  It 
is no surprise that ‘Les trois états du capital culturel’ [the three states of cultural capital] 
(Bourdieu 1979i) explicitly recognised the force of ‘instituted’ capital, nor that the inaugural 
lecture manifested some deference to instituted discourse.  It would have been counter-
productive to seek to question the validity of the institutional authority that he was about to 
seek to exploit for his own purposes. 
In short, consideration of Bourdieu’s professional trajectory in the 1970s suggests that the 
positions extrapolated by Susen as being ‘about language’ can be seen, both prospectively 
and, later, retrospectively, to have been elements of a strategy of self-clarification and self-
justification.  I do not think that evidence exists for the contention that Bourdieu believed in 
the superiority of scientific discourse within a hierarchy of discourses.  Bourdieu wanted to 
sustain the authority of social science so as to safeguard his power to subvert the hierarchy 
but, of course, that ran the risk of actually perpetuating or being thought to perpetuate the 
structure he wanted to disrupt.  Similarly, Bourdieu’s apparent support for stable, instituted 
discourse in opposition to ‘ephemeral’ discourse was an instrumental strategy, equally wide 
open to misinterpretation, to mobilise existing sources of power for the benefit of the 
relatively impotent.  To offer this judgement in these terms is, of course, to accept Bourdieu’s 
account of the unavoidable homogeny between social trajectory and cultural/intellectual 
identity in defence of that account.  This recourse to contextualisation as defence is circular 
and, as a consequence, I want to offer the headings of an argument which would suggest a 
contextualisation of Bourdieu on language that is independent of association with his social 
trajectory (the Passeron approach). This involves acknowledging that Bourdieu’s thinking 
about language was constituted out of a range of influences which he sought to synthesize.  
As such, it is to be understood developmentally in relation to these influences rather than a-
historically as a set of propositions. 
 
Briefly, we know that Bourdieu wrote his diplôme d’études supérieures  on Leibniz’s 
Animadversiones on Descartes.  In the absence of extant copy of that diploma thesis, we can 
only speculate on Bourdieu’s philosophical engagement with the issues at the time it was 
written (in 1954).  However, it seems safe to assume that he would have reflected on 
Leibniz’s distinction between reasons of fact and reasons of logic and would have been 
familiar with Leibniz’s interest in generating a universal language, and possibly with 
secondary texts on Leibniz, such as those of Russell and Couturat at the turn of the century, 
reflecting divergent philosophical positions.  We know from Bourdieu’s recollections in 
‘Fieldwork in philosophy’ in Choses dites (Bourdieu 1987, [1990]) and from his introduction 
to Ce que parler veut dire (Bourdieu, 1982i) that he had early carried out extensive work on 
de Saussure, written a study of de Saussure which he subsequently suppressed, and lectured 
on his linguistic theory when he was an assistant at the University of Algiers at the end of the 
1950s.  By the end of the 1960s and into the 1970s, Bourdieu had clearly become familiar 
with the linguistic dimension of Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms.  He cited an article 
of Cassirer on language in ‘Structuralism and Theory of Sociological Method’ (Bourdieu 
1968), translated a text of one of Cassirer’s disciples - Panofsky (Bourdieu 1967) -, and 
edited the Le sens commun series for the Editions de Minuit which included several 
translations of works of Cassirer including his Langage et mythe (Cassirer (1953), 1973).  He 
positioned himself in relation to Panofsky in ‘Sur le pouvoir symbolique’ (Bourdieu 1977ii) 
as well as in relation there to Sapir and Whorf.  As a part of his intellectual revision in writing 
Esquisse (Bourdieu 1972), he defined himself in opposition to Chomsky’s generative 
grammar and deployed the ideas of Lakoff to harness ‘soft logic’ in support of his case for 
strategic rather than rule-dominated action4. None of this is to suggest that Bourdieu’s 
thinking was indiscriminately eclectic, but it is to argue that his ‘position’ on language was 
intellectually complex and composite without reference to his plea that his works should be 
understood socio-genetically5
 
 in relation to his social trajectory. 
In spite of our disagreements in relation to Bourdieu on language which arise from our 
methodological differences and which lead to contrary judgements, there are, nevertheless, 
two important points on which Susen and I concur.  Firstly, we both want to acknowledge the 
conceptual capacities of ordinary people and to resist the professionalization of social 
knowledge.  In opposition to Susen’s insistence that Bourdieu privileged scientific discourse, 
however, I believe that our common orientation here is one that we share with Bourdieu. 
Secondly, we agree that ontological predispositions are to be found in Bourdieu’s work and 
that these are in need of further exploration.  Susen identifies a fundamental ontology of 
language which amounts to a subterranean philosophy of language and which underlies 
Bourdieu’s commitment to an understanding of linguistic communication within the social 
context which makes it possible. My inclination, rather, is to find a phenomenological 
ontology at the heart of Bourdieu’s work, although not one of a Sartrean variety.  If this 
amounts to an underlying philosophical position, it is a ‘negative philosophy’ as Bourdieu 
stated in Méditations pascaliennes
                                                          
4 I have discussed some of these issues in more detail in Robbins (2000) and Robbins (2005; in English in 2006, 
185-196) 
 (Bourdieu 1997,15; [2000, 7] and the kind of philosophy 
5 See Bourdieu (1993) 
advocated by Merleau-Ponty in his inaugural lecture delivered at the Collège de France in 
January, 1953: L’Eloge de la philosophie [in praise of philosophy] (Merleau-Ponty, 1953).  
As an undergraduate at the time, Bourdieu would certainly have been aware of this lecture 
and, more importantly, of Merleau-Ponty’s paper given at the first Colloque international de 
phénoménologie, held in Brussels in 1951, entitled:  ‘Sur la phénoménologie du langage’ [on 
the phenomenology of language] (Merleau-Ponty 1960, 136-158).  In that paper, Merleau-
Ponty admitted to understanding at last, based on his reading of late Husserl texts in the 
archive at Louvain, what Husserl meant when he asserted that ‘transcendental subjectivity is 
inter-subjectivity’ (quoted in Merleau-Ponty 1960, 157).  My contention is that it was this 
commitment to an egalitarian, pre-predicative inter-subjectivity which constituted Bourdieu’s 






                                                          
6 I have recently discussed in more detail the influence of Husserl on Bourdieu, mediated by Merleau-Ponty in 
Robbins (2012).  In Robbins (2011), I also suggested (pp. 191-2) that an approchement between the intellectual 
projects of Bourdieu and Lyotard, grounded in their common awareness of the work of Husserl and Merleau-
Ponty, might be beneficial in responding to current intellectual and social problems. 
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